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SCIENCE AND MORALITY OF CRIMINAL LAW*
JERoM HAIL"

It may seem paradoxical in these times of confusion and uncertainty
not only for students but also for older persons, that the study of criminal law can be, if not a Gibraltar, certainly a vantage-point on and from
which one can build a significant philosophy of life. Yet, on reflection,
there is no actual paradox because most thoughtful persons would agree
that, in the present, often bewildering situation, it is the moral problems that are most perplexing and challenging. And in our culture
"criminal law" refers primarily to the common law of crimes, the wellknown felonies and misdemeanors, and to an institution and a body of
knowledge that extend from the 18th century to the present time; a law
and a discipline that reflect more than seven centuries of thoughtful
experience, discussion, consultation with experts and the dedication of
a skilled profession. This law, "the common law of crimes", represents
the realism, rationalism and moral outlook of western civilization. No
problem of moral philosophy is beyond its bounds, and those who would
refute the moral skepticism and positivism of our age can find in this
field of law and in the knowledge of it, more abundant support than
anywhere else.
Equally significant is the fact that our basic criminal law, the common
law felonies, is almost universal law. If one examined the European
codes of criminal law and the South American and Asiatic codes stemming from the European codes, and compared them with our law, which
came from England, one would find great uniformity there; indeed,
the criminal law of India, for example, is the common law of crimes.
There are, of course, differences, e.g. in the scales of punishment, but
by and large, the scheme of values as well as the graduation or hierarchy
of harms are remarkably similar. Nor is this well-nigh universal uniformity in the basic criminal law of advanced societies the product
of conquest or of blind imitation; on the contrary, it was for the most
part, freely and thoughtfully discovered or accepted. There is no time
to discuss the implications of this for moral philosophy, but I am confident you see what I am intending with reference to the validity of
these simple valuations about persons, property, and social institutions.
From a point of view to which I shall shortly refer, "criminal law"
has a much wider range than that which includes only the felonies, the
0
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major misdemeanors and many similar statutory crimes. From that
point of view, which differs in important ways from what I shall submit
any law that has a punitive sanction is a criminal law. I shall discuss
the significance of that later, but for the present I should like to keep
before you the common law felonies and major misdemeanors, what
every person usually thinks of when he thinks of crimes or criminals
murder, burglary, arson, robbery and so on.
The other term in the title of this lecture is "science", and that is
even more ambiguous in daily speech where it is employed in the
"science of prize-fighting", the "Science of cooking" and so on. But the
minimum of any definite use of that term must mean an organization or
a system of ideas, and in this sense it is exemplified in the formal sciences,
such as mathematics and logic, and in the empirical-formal sciences
like physics and chemistry. In this more precise use, what is distinctive
and, indeed, the very essence of science, is an organization of ideas.
Without pressing for too close an analogy with physical science, when
I submit that there is a science of criminal law, I am referring to an
organization of ideas.
What are these ideas and how are they organized? I distinguish
three terms or conceptions, which I call "rules", "doctrines" and "principles", and it is by use of these conceptions and their interrelations that
one constructs an organization of ideas that may be called a science of
criminal law. Those of you who have seen European criminal codes
know that they are divided into two parts - a general part and a
special part. The latter deals with the various specific crimes, and
this is what I refer to as comprised of rules. The statute book is full of
such rules. They are more specific than either the doctrines or the
principles. Secondly, they include verbs, such as kills, bums, takes
and carries away. And thirdly, they specify what is distinctive about
each crime; if you wish to know the difference between murder and
arson, or between burglary and larceny, you read the rules. They tell
you what is specific about each crime and how to distinguish one crime
from another.
The second concept referred to, the doctrines, are concerned with
insanity, infancy, intoxication, coercion, mistake, necessity, attempt, solicitation and conspiracy. These are wider propositions and they qualify
and limit all the rules. Take the doctrine of insanity, for example; the
rule that specifies what is larceny, robbery or murder does not state
the entire definition of those crimes because if the person who did the
forbidden acts was insane at that time, no crime was committed. One
might say that the rules are complete as regards normal persons and
normal situations. But the meaning of "normal" depends on that of the
doctrines; these must therefore be taken into account in defining the
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specific crimes. Lawyers refer to them as "defenses", and linguistic
philosophers call them "excuses". That may be proper from a procedural or philosophical point of yew, but what is finally involved is the
definition of a crime. If the behavior was that of an insane person
or an infant, it is not a crime. Since insanity (and infancy, mistake of
fact, etc.) affect all of the specific rules, the doctrines are essential in
the definition of every crime; they limit all the rules.
If you will imagine a musical scale or, better, draw a hundred
horizontal lines and let every one of them represent a rule of criminal
law - a hundred different definitions of crimes. Then draw nine or
ten vertical lines, each intersecting every one of the hundred horizontal
lines. Each of these vertical lines then represents a doctrine (e.g.,
insanity, intoxication, coercion, etc.). Not until all of the hundred
rules have been "joined" to or intersected by these nine or ten doctrines,
is the criminal law stated. Unlike the implication of the general part
of European penal codes, which includes very different kinds of general propositions, doctrines should be distinguished from the third type
of concept, noted above, which is wider than either of the others; and
these are the "principles" of criminal law. If you view the above
imagined "tennis court net", made up of many specific rules and the
nine or ten doctrines, and you stand back from it and ask yourself,
'WVhat,if any, are the fundamental ideas that run through this entire
tennis court net, this fusion of the specific rules and the nine or ten
doctrines?', then, it has seemed to me, one discovers seven fundamental
ideas that permeate the entire corpus of the criminal law, namely,
legality, mens rea, act, the concurrence or fusion of the act (effort) with
the mens rea (the criminal state of mind), harm, causal connection between the conduct and the harm, and punishment, the punitive sanction.
Accordingly, e.g. everything I have said about the rules and the
doctrines implies and must be placed within the frame of legality. No
matter how immoral or anti-social or sinful an act may be, if there is no
positive law which forbids that conduct, it is not a crime. So, too, of
all the other principles - every crime satisfies every one of the seven
principles and if any one of them is lacking, the conduct in issue is not
a crime - in terms of the present theory.
Think next, of any legally forbidden conduct, e.g., setting fire to
another person's building. This conduct is a fusion of a mental state
(mens rea) with an act or effort and thus reflects three criteria expressed
in the three state principles. The remaining principles are expressed in
the statement that such conduct causes harms for which the legally
specified punishment must be applied. From the great variety and
complexity of the specific rules and from the doctrines that, combined
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with them, define all of the very large number of crimes, what emerges
in the final analysis is a very simple proposition in terms of the stated
seven principles - every crime is conduct that produces a harm for
which certain punishment is prescribed - all within the frame of
legality.
The mens rea principle (the Latin equivalent of "evil mind") is
taken here to mean intentionality and recklessness; or more fully, mens
rea is the state of mind expressed in the intentional bringing about of a
legally forbidden social harm or in recklessness regarding the occurrence
of that harm. This plainly excludes the inadvertent negligent harmdoer
or, in other words, in terms of the suggested interpretation, it is the
voluntary harmdoer who is the criminal, not the inadvertent one. The
latter may be awkward or calloused or insensitive to danger, including
danger to himself, but he is not a voluntary harmdoer and, therefore,
in the present view, he is not a criminal. Far from this being a merely
personal predilection or a recent thesis, this principle stems from the
very beginning of western philosophical thought, and it is also expressed
in the earliest Chinese ethics, e.g., by Mencius. As with Aristotle,
Aquinas and Kant, what in this tradition is at the bottom of both blame
and praise is the voluntariness of action. When those philosophers
blamed drunkards and ignorant persons for the harms they committed,
they based their judgment on the prior voluntary misconduct that culminated in the present incompetence.
Before discussing this, it may be helpful to point out the further
significance of the mens rea principle by showing more definitely how
it is related to the entire criminal law. In the first place, the principle
of mens rea is a generalization of all of the mentes reae expressed in the
whole array of specific crimes. Obviously, the state of mind of one
who is setting fire to a house is different in some ways from the state
of mind of one who is killing someone, or of that of a thief. But what
is common to all of their states of mind or, better, to their respective
actions is their voluntary character; there is awareness and a voluntary
movement towards a proscribed actual harm. Such generalization of
what is common is the function of a principle; thus, similarly, e.g. as
regards the principle of harm. Obviously, again, a burned dwelling
house is a different harm than that of a killed human being, and both
are different from the harm of losing one's property. But the principle
or concept of harm signifies that all of these consequences of criminal
actions are alike in being actual disvalues. Thus the principles are highlevel generalizations unifying what is common in the vast array of specific rules qualified by the doctrines. As stated, mens rea is the generalization of what is common in all the mentes reae; however different these
criminal states of mind are in some respects, they and the congruent
conduct express intentionality or recklessness with reference to the com-
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mission of a legally proscribed actual harm. Secondly, mens rea is the
distillation of the negation of all the so-called "excuses" (which I include among the "doctrines"). In other wards, mens rea represents
what is left after all the excuses have been excluded. Thus, conversely,
one could say that mens rea signifies the state of mind of a sane, sober
adult who was not mistaken or coerced, and so on. That was expressed
above in the statement that mens rea is constructed by "adding" the
(relevant) doctrines to the rules.
I must now say that there are two areas which the above science of
criminal law does not fit. One is what lawyers call "strict liability" or
"action at peril," where punitive-sounding sanctions are imposed regardless of the lack of any mes rea. These include violations of food
and drug acts, dealing with alcohol, and many economic regulations
where small fines are imposed; but it is necessary to add that this type
of law has gone far beyond that initial restriction, e.g., bigamy, statutory rape and other crimes where the defendants are imprisoned for
long terms despite the lack of any fault. One of the typical cases of
ordinary strict liability is Dotterweich.' He was employing able persons
and using sound methods of operating his business, but some jars of
spoiled merchandise were shipped out and he was found guilty under
a "strict liability" penal statute. In another case the defendant, who
sold grain, employed the best chemists in the vicinity and they told him
that the grain had 40% oil and, being a very cautious person, (an
English businessman of the old school) he represented that there was
30% oil. But it turned out that the oil content was only 25%, and he
was fined.2 It is impossible here to discuss the various ramifications
of strict liability, but it may be added that Anglo-American law is
peculiar in this regard; on the Continent and elsewhere negligence must
be proved. Most students of criminal law, though not all of them by
any means, agree that strict liability is not properly included in the
criminal law since mens rea and even the highest possible care are
irrelevant.
But the other exception, the other area where the theory I have
dUnited States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). Dotterweich was the president and general manager of Buffalo Pharmacal Company, Inc. The Company was
a jobber in drugs, purchasing drugs from manufacturers, repacking them under their
own labels, and shipping them in intestate commerce. Having shipped a bad batch
of drugs, the Company and Dotterweich were prosecuted for violation of the Federal
Food, Dru.g and Cosmetic Act The act prohibited "[tihe introduction or delivery
introduction, into interstate commerce of any
. . . drug . . . that is adulterated
oror misbranded."
a misdemeanor,
and contained no requirement of nensThe act made any violation eea.
In affirming a conviction of Dotterweich for his innocent violation of the Act,
the court justified this "strict liability" without moral fault by saying that "[i]n the
interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person
otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public
anger."
8202 U.S. at 281. [Ed.]
Laird v. Dobell, 1 K.B. 181 (1906).
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presented does not fit, is much more troublesome. This concerns the
inadvertent negligent harmdoer. The inadvertently negligent harmdoer, of course, should be controlled and the community should be protected by way of civil damages, stricter licensing, more frequent revocation of licenses, and education. I have never seen any evidence supporting the belief that assessing a small fine makes a person more sensitive or careful or a more skillful operator of a machine. But opinion
among legal scholars is divided on this subject.
As I read the history of the common law of crimes, it seems to me
that the judges, when directly faced with this question, have excluded
inadvertent negligence from criminal liability, although there remain
"objective interpretations of recklessness that are at odds with the
centuries-old drive to limit punishment to the voluntary harmdoer. As
seen above, this movement in our legal history accords with the oldest
and most enduring tradition of western moral philosophy. The opposition rests on utilitarian grounds, on deterrence. But not only has it no
factual support, it is internally inconsistent: how can a person be deterred
when he does not know, he does not think or advert to, the possibility of
danger in what he is doing? And is it likely that hearing or reading
about the punishment of negligent persons improves the character or
the skill of insensitive or awkward persons?
More important in the present discussion than this ethical problem
is the question, what is the consequence of this disagreement on negligence so far as the science of criminal law is concerned? The present
situation is that there is the organization of ideas presented above, but
it does not fit strict liability or liability for inadvertent negligence. It
does not include such behavior because mens Tea is restricted to intentionality or recklessness, to voluntary harm-doing. But suppose one
rejects that limitation. How does that affect the science of criminal
law presented here?
It certainly does not invalidate that theory since it does not prove
it is fallacious in the area it covers. The alternative is to produce a better
theory; and a better theory might be one which included negligence
and strict liability as well as voluntary harm-doing and was expressed
in an equally significant set of ideas.
In judging this question, one must recognize that there are limitations on any theory in any science. I am told that there are two competing theories of light, a wave-length theory and a quantum theory.
One of them explains certain aspects of light phenomena but not others.
In economics, theories about supply and demand are valid only under
certain conditions, and the generalizations in chemistry and physics,
i.e., those scientific laws, only apply in so-called ideal conditions. This
is true of every theory.
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"Theory" is a Greek word meaning the knowledge of oneness or
sameness in a field of very disparate data. There are, e.g. trillions of
things in the world and each grain of sand may be distinctive in some
way. The chemists have discovered that there are 103 elements; every
one of these trillions of things is one of those elements or is a combination of two or more of them. Just think what that knowledge means
in the march of human history which has led us from a crude ad hoc
view of trillions of different things to a science that there are only 103
different kinds of things in the universe.
Thus, the question must be raised - if the theory presented here
does not encompass inadvertent negligence and strict liability, what are
the alternative possibilities of increasing our knowledge of the criminal
law? Has someone come forward with a theory that encompasses the
above areas and is also equally significant in specifying substantive
criteria, and in organizing all of this? Professor Wiirzel of Bonn University' maintains that the inadvertent harmdoer perceived stimuli of
something dangerous and he turned his mind away from those warnings. But if this happened, then Professor Wiirzel is not talking about
what I call "inadvertent negligence"; he is talking about recklessness, a
voluntary turning-away from a recognized danger. Perhaps this is a
verbal difference between German law and American law, a difference
in the definition of the above terms. But as the matter stands, I can
only say that I am not much taken with Professor Wiirzers position
because if there is awareness of danger, there is an element of volition
in the consequent action, and therefore recklessness.
Then there is the prevailing formal view of criminal law which
holds that any statute that has a punitive sanction is a criminal law.
But how far does that get one? Its inadequacy as a theory is shown in
the fact that actually, when lawyers are working on their cases they
talk about mwns rea and act and the rest of the principles; but they
haven't organized these insights.
Most of the seven fundamental ideas or "principles" of the criminal
law have been discussed in the literature for a long time; but Stephen,
for example, did not make much of causation and harm. I emphasized
the importance of these concepts but, most of all, I tried to set these
and the other basic ideas into a scheme expressing especially the relations between the specific rules, the doctrines that qualify every one
of them, and the fundamental principles represented in the entire corpus
of criminal law (excepting the moot areas noted above).
Now, from the point of view of the student or lawyer, what is the
advantage of the theory I have been presenting? Can they make any
practical use of it? The answer is plain and easy - they can ask the
seven questions ("principles") about any conduct or any alleged crim-
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inal law. They do not study more than 20 or 80 crimes in law school
and there may be 10,000 or 30,000 crimes. But if they know the seven
principles, then when they deal with other crimes, they need only ask:
Where is the positive law (legality), what is the proscribed act, what
is the mens rea involved here, what is the harm that is described here,
and what about the punitive side and the strict interpretation of the
prescription of that? They know what to look for, what constitutes a
crime as developed in a theory which fits the largest part and the most
significant part, not only of our formally designated "criminal law" but
also of that of all advanced cultures.
Secondly, this knowledge, this set of organized ideas, provides a
basis for criticism. Confronting, e.g. a case allegedly involving strict
liability, the informed lawyer stands on the solid foundation of a body
of knowledge which fits the felonies and the major misdemeanors and
countless new statutes, a body of knowledge that has been pounded out
in more than seven centuries of thoughtful discussion and criticism.
He knows how to represent his client. If you read the MorissetteP case
and others, you will find that able lawyers have narrowed statutes by
use of the established criteria of criminal liability. Or, if you are on
the other side, on the prosecution, that same knowledge helps you to
maintain the opposite view.
Thirdly, and most important, this theory, like any theory that survives through criticism, maximizes understanding of the field. Instead
of a scrapbag of disconnected information that clutters the mind, there
is an organization of the knowledge of criminal law. Knowledge of the
interrelations of the three types of ideas greatly maximizes the knowledge of all of them separated from each other.
This also increases one's knowledge of the morality of criminal law.
I have referred to the common values, representing what might be called
the "ordinary decencies" subsumed in "respect for human beings" which
the criminal law expresses and protects. Every one of those values becomes more significant when it is placed in the network of interrelated
ideas discussed above. Again, the criminal law expresses an objective
3

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).

The defendant, while deer

hunting, came upon a pile of bomb casings which had been used in bombing

practice and left in a pile on the bombing range. The casings were the property of
the United States government. Believing that the bomb casings were not wanted
by the government, the defendant took about three tons of them and sold them
for scrap. All of the allegations of the prosecutor were admitted; the only defense
offered was that the defendant did not intend to steal the casings. The defendant
was convicted on the grounds that the statute under which he was being prosecuted did not make criminal intent a part of the offense. Reversing, the United
States Supreme court stated that where crimes find their origin in the common law,
failure to codify the requirement of intent will not eliminate this necessary element
of the crime. The statute under which the defendant was convicted was simply a

codification of the common law crime of theft, and the court held that the requirement of criminal intent was implied in the statute. [Ed.]
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morality, so that if a person says he did what his conscience told him to
do, that is not a defense although it raises difficult problems for administration. The philosophy of punishment is also rendered more cogent
and more precise when it is constructed by reference to the science of
criminal law. Then, there is the ultimate moral plank, that the criminal
is the voluntary harmdoer, and this merits further comment.
Aristotle, and Aquinas following him, attached culpability to a
drunkard's misconduct on the ground that many times in his past life,
he voluntarily drank, resulting finally in his becoming an habitual drunkard. But they were not concerned with the lawyer's problem - just
what should be done to such a person. Secondly, we are more receptive to the psychology of conditioning in families and in the environment of early childhood; we believe that insensitivity, ignorance and
incompetence are often the product of what happens to people without
any fault on their part. What in any case is more important than my
disagreement with Aristotle and Aquinas in this particular respect is
that the basis of their judgment regarding ignorance and intoxication
remains the (alleged) prior voluntary wrong-doing of those persons.
With this ground I am in full accord, and disagreement about the application of that principle to inadvertent negligence is a relatively minor
matter.
Finally, it is very significant that the acceptance of the above basic
principle of Western moral philosophy is not only compatible with but
also facilitates the discovery of a science of criminal law. This knowledge of morality is the careful articulation of centuries of experience.
There is much to recommend it now in our present dealing with the
difficult and sometimes terrifying problem of crime. If people could
be taught the simple message of our criminal law - not to harm a
human being, and if we could persuade professors of ethics or sociology
to read and study the criminal law, not only would crime diminish,
there would also be much progress in moral philosophy and social science.
I have discussed the interrelationship of certain ideas and it is
necessary to add (although little time remains for discussion) that,
corresponding to the established factual sciences there is a sociology of
criminal law or, at least, the beginning of such a discilpline. For if the
subject matter of the sociology of criminal law is comprised of the
facts referred to by the science of criminal law, it should be possible
to develop a relevant body of empirical knowledge. This unfortunately
has not been done, partly because the model of physics has become
dominant in social science. But if the concepts I have discussed and
their interrelations were observed by social scientists, a significant body
of knowledge might be discovered. There are already several important
studies and types of knowledge, expressed in detailed case-histories, in
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trend-generalizations, in wide generalizations regarding preceding and
concurrent developments, and in definite propositions that resemble
scientific generalizations.
Let me illustrate the last of these by citing some generalizations
which I ventured to make some years ago. I was studying the prosecution of known embezzlers, cases where the employers had sufficient
evidence to secure convictions, and I found that there were relatively
very few prosecutions. The generalizations that emerged were that
the rate of prosecution of known embezzlers is directly in proportion to
the amount of money embezzled and to the amount of publicity given
the crime and inversely in proportion to restitution and to the identification of the employer with his employee. If you compare that kind
of generalization with Boyle's law, for example, (gases expand directly
in proportion to increase in temperature and inversely as to increase in
pressure), noting the interrelation of two variables, the similarity of the
generalizations regarding the prosecution of known embezzlers is
apparent.
It thus seems possible to advance toward an organized, if not
rigorous, body of social knowledge if careful use is made of the science
of criminal law. We would then see more clearly the place and functions of law in society, and would be, well on the way to the construction
of a philosophy of life.

QuEs-oNs

AND

ANswmis

Question (Dean Ares):
Does your system presuppose the existence of the rational man?
Some people would say that there is no such thing as the rational man.
Amwer:
I would say that if there is even a spark of rationality that this makes
all the difference. On this I will not compromise. Some distinguished
psychiatrists have said that all men are irrational but the implication
is "all men except me." For either that psychiatrist is rational or there
is no point in listening to him. If what he is emitting is the same kind
of emotion he is accusing the human race of exhibiting, then what does
he say that entitles him to be listened to? He claims to be saying something that is true, that has a point in it, and that implies that he has at
least a spark or grain of rationality. There aren't many things that I
would go down fighting for, but this is one of them - the most valuable
characteristic of human beings. Think also of the physical sciences,
chemistry and physics, and there is mathematics - how in the face
of these achievements can one defend the thesis that people are 100%
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emotional or irrational? The same applies to legal systems - the
roman law and the common law, and to the science of criminal law.
Question:
What do you think of status crimes and the failure of the bar to
keep up with scientific developments in the hard sciences and the social
sciences, for example, as regards compulsive drinking?
Answer:
In regard to vagrancy, chronic drunkenness and drug addiction,
we are moving in a direction that seems to me to be a sound one, that is,
to distinguish the real criminal from the misfit, the sick, and the subnormal. But I think it is very difficult to solve this problem. What's
been going on is that the notion of "disease," especially "mental disease,"
has been expanded to the point where many persons are troubled. Some
distinguished psychiatrists have said that everyone is mentally diseased.
This means that you or I might be brought before a judge, and on
some kind of testimony of that sort we might be confined in what is
euphemistically called a 'hospital"; so there is plenty of reason to be
concerned about this development. The solution, it seems to me, if
you stand on the solid rock of what we have learned in 700 years of
thoughtful dealing with criminal problems, is to insist on an act of
some kind as the condition of the State's exercising control over anyone;
and also, once that is retained and insisted on, to take control for
longer periods of time in the vast area of petty misdemeanors and to
improve correctional treatment and vocational training of these people.
A strict status crime, if there is any such crime, raises difficult problems
because, even if it is granted that there is an act or an action-pattern,
where is the harm in a culture that prizes leisure? The suggestion I
offered above is premised on the assumption that many vagrants commit petty misdemeanors.
On the second question, I would say that after more than 40 years
of work in law and the social sciences (which carries the plain implication that this was worthwhile) I must say that I am apprehensive about
what is going to happen in many law schools in the next 10 or 15 years.
Many law teachers who are able, critically minded scholars when they
work on legal problems are naive and even gullible when they read
social science and psychiatry. They think psychiatry is a definite body
of established knowledge. Actually, there are a dozen schools of
psychiatry. So, too, in criminology and the other social disciplines.
But there is a long range optimistic view of this question. If you
were to name the greatest social scientist of this century, (an impossible
sort of question) but if you had to pick one, my guess is that most
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would choose Max Weber. He was a lawyer and his first post was
that of professor of law at the University of Freiburg, Germany. He
went from that into economics and sociology. Durkheim, though not a
graduate of a law school, was also well-trained in the law. Legal
scholars, Henry Sumner Maine among them, were the founders of modem
anthropology. That's even truer of political science - no longer so
in this country, but it still holds true in Latin America and Europe. I
am constrained to think that legal scholars have much to contribute to
social science if they work long and critically in one or two disciplines;
not only will they advance their own knowledge of law, they will also
make great contributions to the social sciences.
Question:
To what extent are legislators aware of the science of criminal law
and utilize it?
Answer:
I have a feeling that a lot of what comes out of state legislators is
hit and miss. We don't have many of the type of legislator Plato admired
(Solon and Lycurgus) who, for him, represented the greatest perfection
any human being could achieve. Every Greek citizen knew the fundamentals of his law. I would like to see at least criminal law taught in
high schools and colleges in ways not intended to train practitioners. I
also wish philosophers would study the criminal law, always, of course,
with a searching attitude. The wonderful thing about the common
law of crimes is that it was never taken as a set of dogmas laid down by
power groups and imposed on the people. When we find ourselves
struggling with these same kinds of difficult problems, we need not start
from scratch. People who think they do that are only innocent of the
history of the criminal law and of the thought that many able persons
have devoted to the subject. If you are suggesting that many of our
legislators ought to be trained in that kind of thinking, I would certainly
second your proposal.
Dean Ares:
I might add a footnote. In the last few years there has been an
effort to systemize the criminal law anew, influenced very heavily by
Dr. Hall's work: For example, the Model Penal Code which was promulgated in the last few years, was an attempt to state a complete
system of criminal law.

